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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

Traité de Logique. E. GOBLOT. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin. 1918. Pp. xxiii + 412.

Important logic books are usually distinguished as falling into one of two main classes. Either they interpret, with a sympathy which amounts to acceptance, the traditional or "formal" logic, or, leaving traditional logic almost wholly on one side, they give us a new theory of the work and characteristic standards of thought—usually in such a way that "logic" and "theory of knowledge" tend to lose their distinguishing outlines and coincide. As an example of the first class, we have the work of writers like Mr. H. W. B. Joseph, and as examples of the second, the work of men like Sigwart, Bradley, Bosanquet and Wundt, and of movements such as we find exemplified in pragmatism and neo-realism.

Professor Goblot's treatise is difficult to classify. He does not range himself clearly with some definite group of thinkers with whom he finds himself in sympathy, and then devote his energies to carrying on the work of that group. Indeed, the work of the various philosophical groups, and even the main tendencies of his fellow-workers in logical study seem to leave him indifferent.[1] Perhaps it would be more just to say that he is so much interested in developing his own thought, that he leaves to others the question of making comparisons with the thought of other logicians.

One characteristic of the book must be admitted at once—its originality. The charming preface of Emile Boutroux is hardly needed to inform the reader that his former pupil has worked his own way to his own conclusions, and that the study of scientific method, especially as exemplified in mathematics, has been especially influential in forming his thought. The detailed treatment of the concept as a "virtual judgment," the theory of deduction as quasi-mathematical, the theory of teleological induction with its mindless purposefulness—these and many other theories bear the undeniable stamp of the author's discovery. Indeed, there is hardly a page in the book but reads like a genuine discovery, and it may fairly be confessed that the chief characteristic of Goblot's work is its originality.

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[1] For example, the idealist and neo-realist schools are hardly mentioned, even by implication. Pragmatism *is* mentioned, but in a perfectly external way. The "Logic of Relations" is discussed briefly, in reference to a criticism of Lachelier. Lotze, Bradley, Bosanquet, Wundt, Erdmann, Dewey, and their characteristic doctrines, escape all mention. Sigwart is mentioned once, but only in order to support a negative criticism of a theory traditionally ascribed to Kant.

Originality—yes. But are these discoveries *new*? Does Goblot add anything to what we have already learnt from other recent writers? Let us consider. The rôle of intelligence is said to be to substitute art for nature, and we are explicitly informed (§ 2) that one of the novelties of the book consists in regarding "substitution of the imperative for the indicative" as the essence of reasoning. When, however, we read the chapter in which this view is further developed (chapter XVII., on value-judgments), we learn that intelligence finds means to ends, but the ends are indemonstrables, arising out of the depths of our nature with the force of an imperative. But this is in essence nothing more or less than our old friend, the practical syllogism of Aristotle, tricked out in modern guise.

Again, in dealing with the theoretical syllogism, we are told that, while the "categorical" syllogisms of Aristotle do not advance thought, a kind of syllogism for the discovery, or at least elaboration, of which Goblot claims credit—the "hypothetical" syllogism—does advance thought. The detail of hypothetical syllogisms is worked out so as to correspond to the details of *Barbara, Celarent, etc.,*[2] and is certainly new. But the principle involved is surely not in any sense new. Its discovery, in acceptable form, is usually associated with the name of Sigwart, if not of Lotze, and it has long ago become an integral portion of modern logic. Indeed, in principle, the standpoint taken by Goblot's treatise has already been passed. For since the work of Bradley and Bosanquet has familiarized us with the view that all thought is both categorical and hypothetical—categorical so far as sensory, and hypothetical so far as intellectual—Goblot's sharp opposition of the concepts "categorical" and "hypothetical" as applied to inference has lost much of its point. In spite, then, of genuine originality,[3] Goblot has here failed to reach the front-line trenches of present-day logical advance.

A third discovery, in the light of Goblot's own studies of mathematical method, is that thought is essentially synthetic. The essence of mathematical inference, for example, consists in the "construction." But surely this has been a philosophical commonplace since the time of Kant, and for a student familiar with the work of Lotze and Sigwart—to mention no others—contains nothing which could be called new. Indeed, since Bradley's demonstration of the interconnection of analysis and synthesis, and especially since the very thorough treatment which the constructive work of thought has received at the hands of almost all modern logicians, it is hardly too much to say that Goblot's discoveries in this field, though undoubtedly original—*i. e.*, made by himself—are almost naïve. He writes as though "formal" logic in its older form still held the field and needed to be routed.

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[2] Goblot follows Lachelier in refusing to recognize a fourth figure. He also identifies the negative moods of the first two figures. *Datisi* and *Disamis* are also identified.

[3] By "originality," it is meant that Goblot makes his own discoveries, whether by discovering for himself *paths already known* to others, or whether by discovering *new paths* which lead to known conclusions. It is not meant that the *conclusions* are unknown. Sometimes this happens to be the case, and then Goblot's thought is not only original, but also discovers something which his colleagues would regard as new.

In a number of points, then, which are of fundamental importance, the book presents us with little which can fairly be called new. It remains to discuss one other point, which—at least at first sight—seems more promising. This is the treatment of "teleological inference." Stated briefly, his view is as follows: Baconian logic studies causal laws. But there are various types of causal laws, and the time has come to make an advance upon the logic of Bacon and Mill. Causation in the usual sense is regarded as a continuous chain without beginning or end, but there is one type of causal series which is more than this. Certain series have, even as processes *in rerum natura,* a beginning and an end, and scientists employ specialized tests for dealing with such special causal series. Examples are to be found, *e. g.*, in physiology, in such cases as the creation of an organ by a function. Some initial stimulus sets in motion processes which come to an end when an appropriate organ has come into being. There is in such cases a purposefulness on the part of nature, and it is exemplified in many biological phenomena, such as natural selection, adaptation, *etc.* This purposefulness is, of course, unconscious, and the conscious purposefulness with which, *e. g.*, human beings adapt themselves to concrete situations, should not be regarded as the exercise of a "free" will—whatever that might mean—but simply as a more complex form of this fundamental biological purposefulness. Just as the logic of Bacon and Mill provides canons for establishing laws of causality, so the new teleological logic should provide special canons for testing and, where possible, establishing the special kind of causality which is purposeful. Purpose and causality are thus not rigidly opposed to one another, but what we call purpose is simply a specialized kind of causality, and its study should be recognized as legitimately belonging to the sphere of a rigidly empirical science.

That this view is largely "original," there is no reason to doubt; and as applied in this way to logic, it is also largely new. But in itself the theory is not entirely novel. The view that disturbance of the equilibrium of an organism leads gradually to the recovery of a new equilibrium, is well known in biology, and has been very fully worked out in psychology.[4] In Goblot's treatise, the comparison with the "inductive logic of Bacon and Mill" is certainly suggestive, but his treatment is thin and sketchy, and leaves us with a mere outline.

So much for the major points. Minor points are treated in the same kind of way. That is to say, the discussion is almost always suggestive, and occasionally seems illuminating, but further reflection produces doubt as to whether the reader has really learnt anything which could be called *new*. Thus the treatment of the "indemonstrables" as essentially admitting of alternatives from a strictly theoretical viewpoint is admirably clear and illuminating, and seems highly original—but in principle is thoroughly familiar to every student of the Kantian "antinomies." The treatment of definition seems fresh and original. The treatment of classification seems original, indeed, but poor, and produces no accession of insight. The student of Wundt already knows more about classification than Goblot can tell him, and in the case of definition, he is left wondering whether the chief function of definition is, after all, to substitute a clear for an obscure conception. He also wonders whether Goblot really believes that such an entity as an "initial" definition—a modern version of the Aristotelian "essence"—is really attainable by man.

Apart from questions of content, the book is written very unevenly. Certain chapters—especially in the more "formal" part—are so much condensed as to be at times obscure. In a few sections it is even necessary to take pencil and paper, and work one's way through the various statements as if they were so many unfamiliar algebraical examples. In other chapters—especially chapters XIV.–XVII.—the treatment is so loose and sketchy, that one is surprised to see them published in what is professedly a systematic treatise[5] on logic.

Partly for this reason, and partly for others, it is far from clear for what class of readers the book is intended. Certain portions—*e. g.*, the first part of chapter XVIII., and a number of the simpler historical explanations, such as the characterizations of Aristotelian and Baconian logic—might be read by the veriest beginners. Other portions—*e. g.*, most of the closer reasoning in chapters III.–X.—might be worked through with profit by the average college graduate in this country. But few students would be able to appreciate the later chapters (XIV.–XVII.), and in any case the reader's judgment would be much exercised in deciding what he ought to label as "Goblot's view" and what, on the other hand, he might safely regard as authoritative. For example, the reader is told that judgments of difference are affirmative, and judgments of identity are negative in character, and there is not the slightest hint that a consensus of logical opinion takes the opposite view. He is also informed that no *logical* arguments have ever been brought against Hamilton's doctrine of the quantification of the predicate, and that, in fact, the doctrine is acceptable.[6] It is further stated that the procedure of mathematics is typically *de*ductive, and there is not the slightest hint that other authorities—such as Wundt, and even writers of elementary manuals, such as S. H. Mellone—regard it as largely *in*ductive, and that, in fact, modern logicians generally regard induction and deduction as two complementary aspects of one and the same type of logical thought. His own distinction amounts to stating that induction contains an explicit reference to sensory experience, whereas in deduction such a reference is only implicit. The distinction is not, however, very clearly brought out. From these illustrations, it should be sufficiently evident that the book is scarcely to be regarded as containing information which the would-be student of modern logic could implicitly accept.

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[4] By G. F. Stout, in his *Analytic Psychology*.

[5] The preface, written by Boutroux, explains the thread of connection here, but it remains true that the connection is to be found in the preface, rather than in the chapters in question.

The principle underlying the above criticism is simple. It is not urged that Goblot's contentions are not frequently valuable and true. The sole objection made to his work is that it is too individualistic, and that not enough account is taken of the great modern logicians whose theories are universally recognized as holding the field. He can not be said to align himself with any well-defined philosophical tendency, and his work accordingly lacks a thoroughgoing unity. Three tendencies are prominent, but none of them is carried through. (1) There is a sociological attitude present in the introduction, in the second chapter, and again in the fourteenth chapter—*i. e.*, a tendency to regard logic as arising in answer to social problems. Along with this goes a tendency to regard truth with its claim to necessity, as a social convention or agreement which approximates to a human universality. But this is not worked out in detail, and the epistemological problems to which it gives rise are not definitely faced. (2) There is also a psychological tendency.

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[6] The common lecture-room criticism is that the doctrine leads to "identical judgments" or tautologies. "Some negroes are men," *e. g.*, becomes, when fully determined, "Some negro-men are some negro-men." Other *logical* criticisms in the literature are to be found, *e. g.*, in Erdman's *Logik*, 2d edit., pp. 352 ff.; W. Nedich in Wundt's *Philosophische Studien*, III., pp. 157 ff.; Welton's *Manual of Logic*, I., pp. 200 ff.; Joseph's *Introduction to Logic*, pp. 198 ff., *etc.*

Logic is regarded as belonging to the "psychology of intelligence," on the ground that the belief that a statement is *true* influences our actions. With this is connected the "substitution of the imperative for the indicative" mentioned above, and a tendency to regard ideals as ultimately psycho-physical. He maintains, *e. g.*, like Hobbes and Spinoza, that a thing is *good* because we want it, and not that a reasonable person should want it because after rational deliberation he decides that it is "good." This psychological tendency, however, is almost entirely without influence upon the main body of the work (chapters III.–XI.). (3) Finally there is the interest in a "teleological" logic, to which reference has already been made; but this also is hardly worked out in detail. We are thus left with the conviction that the book is little more than a collection of detailed attempts to deal piecemeal with groups of problems usually regarded as falling within the province of logic, but that the treatment is neither in a line with recent work on the subject, nor in itself perfectly unitary and consistent. On many detailed questions his conscientious and careful study often results in a satisfactory clearness, but, taken as a whole, the book is disappointing. No large and clear-cut aim has been achieved.

RUPERT CLENDON LODGE.

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